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Abstract
We propose an alternative method for investigating whether firms improve performance through
mergers after taking into account the selection bias of merging firms. We simultaneously consider
the dynamics of firm performance and the merger decision by employing full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) estimation. Our study diers from previous studies in that state dependence, un-
observable heterogeneity, and selection bias are incorporated simultaneously. Because the eects of
mergers may be felt gradually, the dynamic eects of mergers and the factors associated with these
dynamics should be taken into account. Our FIML approach complements the strategy used in the
extant literature for investigating the eects of mergers on firm performance.
JEL classifications: D24, F23, G34
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Productivity, Selection Bias
2
1 Introduction
This paper focuses on firms’ performance following corporate mergers. Identifying the gains from merg-
ers is a dicult task, and the empirical studies to date provide mixed results. Some studies find that
mergers improve firms’ resource utilization. For example, using 264 large mergers of unregulated in-
dustrial firms in the United States during the period 1980–2004,Davos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy
(2008) demonstrate that the average total synergy in their sample is a highly significant 10.03% after
being scaled by the combined premerger equity value of the merging firm. Other studies, however, show
an insignificant eect of mergers on firm performance (Ghosh (2001)). Overall, the underlying sources
of merger-related gains have not been clearly identified.
To identify a synergy gain, we must consider whether the performance of the two merging firms
would have changed in the absence of the merger. One way to address this problem is to use any abnormal
operating performance benchmarked to firms in the same industry as the two merging firms (e.g. Gugler,
Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2003)). Typically, a median firm is used as the benchmark, and the overall
assumption is that a merging firm’s performance, as measured by, say, productivity or profits, would have
changed in the same manner as the unmerged benchmark firm. However, acquiring firms’ performance
might be better than that not only of a target firm but also of a median firm. If this is the case, the reported
results may fail to address the question of whether mergers improve performance.
Using US data, Ghosh (2001) reports statistically significant estimates of performance improvements
of 2.4% per annum when firms’ characteristics and acquiring firms’ previous performance are not ac-
counted for. However, when the postacquisition performance of merged firms is compared with that of
matched firms based on pre-event performance and size, the median improvements following corporate
acquisitions are reported as 0.27% and 0.26% per annum, respectively, with both estimates statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Ghosh (2001) concludes that merged firms’ postacquisition operating cash
flow does not increase when control firms matched on performance and size from pre-event years are
used as a benchmark. By contrast, based on the same methodology as Ghosh (2001), Powell and Stark
(2005) show that the median increase in posttakeover operating performance for acquiring firms in the
UK ranges from 0.13% per annum to a statistically significant 1.78% per annum.1
1Davos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy (2008) use Value Line forecasts of financial data to assess the expected synergies.
They compare the last available forecasts for the standalone acquiring and target firms with the first available forecasts for the
merged firm, assuming that the premerger forecast incorporates any expected change in performance unrelated to the merger.
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We agree with the argument in Ghosh (2001) that it is necessary to take into account the acquiring
firms’ characteristics and premerger performance when evaluating the eect of mergers. The problem is
that the research design employed by Ghosh (2001) and Powell and Stark (2005) cannot avoid selection
bias. They compare the postacquisition performance of merged firms with that of control firms matched
on premerger performance and size based on Barber and Lyon (1996) and Loughran and Ritter (1997). In
this procedure, it is assumed that merging firms dier from matched firms only in that they experience the
merger, and that the merger is as good as randomly assigned conditional on the premerger performance
and size. However, we do not see any particular reason why we can control the selection bias of merger
decision by these covariates. Other factors such as leverage or previous merger history might also aect
the likelihood of merger activity. In such cases, the estimated results would be biased.
Given this situation, we propose an alternative method of investigating whether firms improve per-
formance through mergers after incorporating the selection bias of mergers. We simultaneously consider
the dynamics of firm performance and the merger decision by employing full information maximum like-
lihood (FIML) estimation, as in the analysis by Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) of the link between
exports and firm performance. Our study diers from previous studies in that we exploit the dynamic
nature of panel data by simultaneously incorporating state dependence, unobservable heterogeneity, and
corrections for selection bias. Because the eects of mergers may be felt gradually, the dynamic eects
of mergers and the factors associated with these dynamics should be taken into account. In particular,
unobservable heterogeneity can be a driving force in estimating a dynamic decision problem. Our FIML
approach complements the strategy used in the extant literature for investigating the eects of mergers
on firm performance.
We find that when we do not control for selection bias of merger decisions, mergers have no eect
on firm productivity. After controlling for selection bias, however, we find a large decline in productivity
following the merger, and at best only a small increase in the third year after the merger. These results
suggest the importance of controlling for selection bias if the productivity gains from mergers are to be
properly evaluated.
We also find that mergers by other firms in the same industry encourage the merger decision of each
firm, consistent with the merger wave story. The positive eect on a firm’s performance is found from
This approach has the advantage that it eectively minimizes any concern regarding survivorship bias and the external noise
associated with using a long time series of realized cash flow data because of the short interval in the timing of the forecast
(three months between the two sets of forecasts).
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other firms’ mergers in the same industry. This might imply that the merger wave reflects the productivity
shock to the industry (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)), and the productivity shock at the industry level
aects the firm’s performance.
Previous work in this area tries to identify the types of merger that aect firm performance. For
example, Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005) study the performances of acquired firms in the UK
in more than 4,000 acquisitions of domestic, cross-border, public, and private targets. In this study, we
consider domestic, cross-border, and horizontal mergers, and examine the eect of each type of merger
on productivity after controlling for selection bias. Our findings reveal that not all types of merger provide
positive eects on productivity and, especially, that domestic mergers have positive productivity eects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Sections 3
and 4 present our theoretical and empirical model. Section 5 describes our sample and presents some
descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents the major empirical results and Section 7 addresses robustness
issues. In Section 8, we examine the eects of dierent types of merger on productivity and we conclude
in Section 9.
2 Related Literature
The eects of mergers on firm performance have been widely studied in the corporate finance and indus-
trial organization literature. When productivity serves as a performance measure, the results regarding
performance gains from mergers are mixed, depending on whether the examined plants are acquired,
acquiring, or a composite of the two. For example, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) and McGuckin and
Nguyen (1995) reveal positive productivity gains from mergers with more productive firms or plants.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) conclude that the gain in productivity of assets under new ownership is
higher when selling firm’s productivity is low and is higher the more productive the buyer. Schoar (2002)
find positive productivity eects in acquired plants and negative eects in incumbent plants.
Our paper is also related to the issue of a diversification discount; that is, diversifying firms have
a lower value than standalone firms. Many empirical studies confirm the presence of a diversification
discount (e.g. Lins and Servaes (1999)), although Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) show
that the existence of the diversification discount is subject to selection bias.2 Indeed, both these studies
find that the diversification discount disappears after controlling for endogeneity. Given that the choice
2To control for selection bias,Campa and Kedia (2002)use Heckman (1979)’s two-step estimator and Villalonga (2004)
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of counterparty for any merger is an endogenous decision, the same implication can apply not only to
diversification cases, but to all mergers.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we establish a theoretical framework for understanding the eects of mergers on produc-
tivity. We first consider our productivity measure for examining the eects of mergers. We then consider
the dynamic choice problem of mergers to control for the problem of selection bias.
3.1 Productivity
We employ productivity measured by total factor productivity (TFP) as our performance measure. We
consider a simple Cobb–Douglas-type production function:
Q = AK0 L1Raw2 ,
where Q is output, A is a technology shift parameter, K is capital, L is labor input, Raw is raw
material purchases, and  are parameters. We use total sales as Q, depreciable assets as K, the number of
employees as L, and raw material purchases as Raw. We estimate the following equation:
ln Qit = lnA + 0lnKit + 1lnLit + 2Rawit + it,
where it is the error term. To control for unobservable heterogeneity, we employ fixed-eects es-
timation. Note that our measure of TFP is real TFP, which is the residual from the above estimation
equation normalized by the producer price index.
We consider that both mergers and technology development activities aect TFP; thus, assume that
TFP is a function of covariates: T FPt = f (Yt 1;Yt 2;    ; Yt  j;Zt;    ; Zt k), where Yt denotes a merger
in period t, Zt are covariates such as R&D expenses, and j and k are lagged indices. As it takes time
for mergers to have an eect on merged firms, we specify the eects of lagged merger decision variables
on TFP. Then, our purpose is to test for the existence of potential synergy gains. For instance, we
examine whether we find @T FPt=@Yt 1 > 0, that is, whether or not the one-year lagged merger increases
productivity.
uses a propensity score method.
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3.2 Merger decision
To consider the self-selection problem explicitly, we model merger choice. Firms decide whether to
engage in a merger in each period, which leads to the situation where firms confront a dynamic discrete
choice problem (see, for example, Adda and Cooper (2003) and Roberts and Tybout (1997)). We assume
that firms face uncertainty about future profits and have to incur sunk costs such as entry costs to engage
in merger activity. As the merger decision is discrete, we consider the following decision variable:
Yit =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if merger
0 otherwise:
By choosing the sequence of merger decisions, firm i maximizes the sum of discounted future gross
profits in period t:
max
Yi
Et
1X
t=1
t 1R(Xit;Yit);
where  is the discount factor, R(:; :) is the gross profit function, and Xit includes state and exogenous
variables. The maximized choice of Yi = fYitg1t=1 constructs the value function. There is an entry cost of
merger, C, which is the cost of developing an in-house legal department or obtaining consulting services
for merger transactions. Once firms have set up these facilities, the entry cost can be saved, such that
C = F if Yt 1 = 0, and 0 otherwise. We consider that knowledge about merger transactions is sustained or
depreciates only gradually, so if Yt 1 = 1 but Yt 2 = 0, firms have to incur costs, F0( F). We assume that
these costs are irreversible and sunk, and thus the merger decision has an option value under uncertainty.
For example, if market conditions improve in the next period, it would be more profitable to engage in a
merger during that period. The Bellman equation is:
V = max[V1;V0] = max[R(Xt; 1)   F(1   Yt 1)   F0Yt 1(1   Yt 2) + EV(Xt+1; 1);R(Xt; 0) + EV(Xt+1; 0)]:
Firms decide to undertake a merger when:
V1   V0 > 0 () R(Xt; 1)   R(Xt; 0) + [EV(Xt+1; 1)   EV(Xt+1; 0)]   F(1   Yt 1)   F0Yt 1(1   Yt 2) > 0:
(1)
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Therefore, the merger decision depends on the dierence in profitability, the dierence in future
expected value, and the previous period’s merger decision.
4 Empirical Specifications
In this section, we introduce the specifications used in the empirical analysis.
4.1 Models
Although it is dicult to specify what aects TFP in general, R&D is known to be one of the most
important factors accounting for the variance in TFP (e.g. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990)). It may take
several years for R&D expenditure to have a significant impact on TFP, but our sample period is not
suciently long to capture this aspect completely. Therefore, we proxy average R&D expenditure in the
past by including current and one- and two-year lagged R&D in the regression. Given that R&D expendi-
ture fluctuates less frequently than capital expenditure, we may assume a high correlation between R&D
expenditures in each period.
We express TFP using the following linear form:
T FPit = 0 + 1Yit 2 + 2Yit 3 + 3R&Dit + 4R&Dit 1 + 5R&Dit 2 + it; (2)
where Yit 2 and Yit 3 are the merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions in years t   2 and t   3, re-
spectively. Considering the accounting irregularity just after the merger, we use only two- and three-year
merger lags in the analysis. Similarly, R&Dit, R&Dit 1, and R&Dit 2 are R&D expenditures in years t,
t   1, and t   2, respectively.
With respect to the merger decision, we follow the reduced-form approach as in Roberts and Tybout
(1997) and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998). We consider the value function as a function of covariates,
and we denote the first part of Equation (1) by:
R(Xit; 1; Yit 1)   R(Xit; 0;Yit 1) + [EV(Xit+1; 1)   EV(Xit+1; 0)] = Xit + it;
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where Xit is a matrix of covariates and  is a parameter vector. Hence, V1   V0 > 0 is expressed by
1Yit 1 + 2Yit 1(1  Yit 2)+ Xit+ it > 0. The sunk costs of mergers allow us to include previous merger
decisions, Yit 1 and Yit 2.
4.2 FIML estimation: Selection bias
To address the self-selection problem, we employ the FIML estimation as in Clerides, Lach, and Tybout
(1998). The main equation is the TFP equation as expressed by Equation (2).
We denote that the decision to engage in a merger is 1 if V1   V0 > 0 and 0 otherwise. Thus, the
merger decision depends on firms’ characteristics and performance and their previous merger decisions:
Yit = I(1Yit 1 + 2(1   Yit 1)Yit 2 + Xit + 1 + 1it > 0);
where I() is the indicator function and:
Xit = 0 + 1TFPit + 2Empit + 3Debt/Assetit + 4CapitalIntensityit:
The covariates are TFP, the number of employees (Emp), the debt–asset ratio (Debt/Asset), the
capital–labor ratio (CapitalIntensity), and time dummies. These are all considered in the existing lit-
erature as determinants of merger. TFP is included to control for performance. We use the number
of employees to control for the eects of firm size. For instance, Arikawa and Miyajima (2008) argue
that larger firms tend to engage in M&A more frequently. To control for the eect of capital structure
on the merger decision, we include the ratio of debt to total assets. Here, we assume that firms with
higher leverage have less incentive to engage in mergers because of the threat of bankruptcy. By contrast,
firms with greater capital intensity may be more likely to engage in mergers, as the ecient merger of
human resources is more dicult than that of physical capital; therefore, we use capital intensity as an
independent variable. We also include year dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks.
We consider the joint distribution of (T FPt+1;Yt), and assume that the distribution of errors is joint
normal: (1; 2)  N(0;). We incorporate unobserved heterogeneity terms, 1 and 2, in this likelihood
function and integrate out these unobservable terms using the Gauss–Hermite quadrature method with
five grid points.
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In a dynamic model, we need to control for the initial condition problems (Heckman (1981)). We
adopt an approximation solution that represents the initial period’s choice probability using probit and
allows the initial period error term to correlate with the errors in subsequent periods. The likelihood
function is then:
L =
Z Z
[Nn=12=1(W1n+1)[1   (W2n)]Yn(W2n)1 Yn]
 Nn=1Tt=3(W1nt+1)[1   (W2nt)]Ynt(W2nt)1 Ynth(1; 2)d1d2;
where W1n+1 = (T FPn+1   Zn+1˜   22)=2, W2n =  [Xn ˜ + 11(12=2)(T FPn   Zn˜  
2)]
p
1   12=2, W1nt = (T FPnt   Znt   3Ynt 1   4Ynt 2   5Ynt 3   2)=2, and W2nt =  [1Ynt 1 +
2(1   Ynt 1)Ynt 2 + Xnt + 1(12=2)(T FPnt   Znt   3Ynt 1   4Ynt 2   5Ynt 3   2)]
p
1   12=2.
Znt and Zn j include R&D, (1; 2) are assumed to be joint normal, and 1 and 2 are correlation
parameters. The derivation of the likelihood function is drawn from Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1996).
This specification takes into account the selection bias of mergers. To assess the short- and long-run
eects of mergers, we incorporate not only the one-year lagged value in the TFP equation, but also the
two- and three-year lagged values.
5 Data and Summary Statistics
5.1 Sample selection
We employ data for 589 Japanese firms listed on the First and Second Sections of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. The sample period is 1999–2006. We exclude firms in the financial and utility sectors from
our sample because the regulation of these sectors is substantially dierent from that of other sectors. We
also exclude firms without any R&D expenditure record during the sample period. This process generates
a sample of 523 of the 589 firms included in the manufacturing sector. The financial data for the sample
firms are from the Nikkei AMSUS and NEEDS databases. Our merger data originate from RECOF’s
M&A database of Japanese companies.
We identify (a) all mergers with publicly traded bidding firms and (b) all acquisitions including partial
acquisitions with publicly traded bidding firms. We classify firms as engaging in a merger in the year in
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which they announced the merger decision. In other years, firms are classified as nonmerger firms.3
5.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 details the number of mergers by year and type. As shown, during the period from 1999 to 2006,
there were 629 merger announcements. The aggregate value of the Japanese M&A market, which had
been around 2 trillion yen per annum through to 1997, surged to 18 trillion yen in 1999 when a series of
bank consolidations were announced (mergers involving nonfinancial firms accounted for about 8 trillion
yen). Since 2000, the scale of the M&A market has been in the range of around 5 to 11 trillion yen per
year, but surpassing 15 trillion yen in 2006 (Arikawa and Miyajima (2008)). In our sample, the number
of mergers rose from 60 deals in 1999 to 107 deals in 2006.
We classify each merger as horizontal or nonhorizontal, and domestic or nondomestic. A merger is
defined as horizontal where the bidder and target are in the same industry, and nonhorizontal otherwise.
Horizontal mergers make up around 52–62% of all deals in the sample. We define a domestic merger
as a deal where both the bidder and target firms are Japanese. Domestic mergers, which took place at
a low level during the 1980s, started to increase rapidly from the late 1990s, ultimately averaging about
70% of all deals during our sample period. We define a deal as a cross-border merger where the bidder is
domestic and the target firm is in another country. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables
used in the analysis and the basic characteristics of the bidding firms in our sample.
6 Results: Productivity Changes and the Merger Decision
In this section, we first report the results on whether mergers on average increase the productivity of
acquiring firms.
The first and second columns in Table 3 provide the results of the TFP equation estimated by the
fixed-eects model of panel estimation without considering the selection bias. We include the R&D ratio
of the current period in column (1), and we add one- and two-year lags of R&D ratio in the regression
for column (2). We can see no significant eect of mergers on TFP in the sample firms. The coecients
for the two- and three-year merger lags show no significant results in the regression.
3The indicator variable takes a value of one for firms that undertake multiple mergers in the same year.
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The estimates in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 reflect the use of FIML to correct for selection
bias. We include the R&D ratio of the current period in column (3), while we add the one- and two-
year lags of R&D ratio in the regression for column (4). Then, we find a significant eect of mergers
on firm performance; this shows the importance of controlling for self-selection bias in the estimation.
In column (3), for example, we observe a 12.6% decline in productivity two years after the merger.
Conversely, the estimated coecients for the three-year merger lags are significantly positive at the 1%
level. This suggests that the productivity of firms declines significantly after the merger, and begins to
increase slightly three years after the merger. Firms, on average, have at best small productivity gains
from mergers following the painstaking process of organizational integration.
Consider now our FIML estimates of the merger decision. Our hypothesis is that because of the pres-
ence of sunk costs, such as the cost of developing an in-house legal department or obtaining consulting
services for merger transactions, the probability of the current merger decision should positively relate to
previous merger decisions. That is, we expect the coecient for the merger lag to be positive. As shown
in Table 4, however, we find no evidence that previous merger decisions aect current merger decisions
when using the full sample in columns (1) and (2).
In terms of control variables, we find results that are fully consistent with our expectations. First,
the coecient of the number of employees is significantly positive, which means that larger firms tend to
engage in mergers more frequently. As for the debt–asset ratio, the coecient is significantly negative, as
firms with less leverage are more likely to engage in mergers. Finally, the coecient of the capital–labor
ratio is significantly positive; therefore, firms with greater capital intensity are more likely to engage in
mergers.
7 Robustness
The basic pattern of results in the previous section is robust to a number of alternative specifications. We
show these results in this section.
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7.1 Eect of other firms’ mergers
Industry mergers are known to occur in waves because of the technological link between firms in the
same industry.4 For example, a merger by a firm that is implementing a technological innovation may
induce follow-on takeovers among industry rivals for these to remain competitive. Then, we investigate
whether other firms’ mergers in the same industry influence further merger decisions, and also explore
whether or not the eects of mergers on firm performance are aected by other firms’ mergers in the
same industry.
Column (1) of Table 5 shows positive eects from other firms’ mergers in the same industry. The
increase in merger activity in the industry as a whole leads to an improvement in the productivity in each
firm. Given that the merger wave reflects the productivity shock to the industry as a whole (Andrade,
Mitchell, and Staord (2001)), this might suggest that the productivity shock in the industry level aects
firms’ performance.
In column (1) of Table 6, we find significant results for mergers by industry peers. When the number
of mergers by other firms in the same industry is higher, the firm is more likely to engage in merger
activity. In other words, mergers by other firms in the same industry encourage further merger decisions.
This is consistent with the “merger wave” literature, which suggests that mergers cluster by industries,
and that merger decisions are aected by prior mergers by industry peers (Cai,Song, and Walking (2011)).
In terms of the coecients for other control variables, we find results similar to our previous findings.
The coecient of the number of employees is significantly positive, the coecient of the debt–asset ratio
is significantly negative, and the coecient of the capital–labor ratio is significantly positive.
7.2 Alternative TFP
In the above analysis, we use fixed-eect models to estimate the production function, and TFP is the
residual from these estimates. As Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) point out, however, the estimates of the
production function yield biased parameter estimates if there is a correlation between input levels and the
unobserved firm-specific productivity. It is highly likely that firms experience unobserved productivity
shocks caused by mergers, and therefore we observe a correlation between input levels and the unob-
4There is substantial industrial evidence of industry-clustering mergers, such as in Arikawa and Miyajima (2008), Mitchell
and Mulherin (1996), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Andrade and Staord (2004), and Harford (2005).
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served firm-specific productivity when firms that have a positive productivity shock respond by using
more inputs.
The results in column (2) of Tables 5 and 6 use TFP, which is measured based on the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) method for estimating production functions. Consistent with previous results, the
coecient for the two-year merger lag is significantly negative in column (2) of Table 5, although the
magnitude of the eect falls to almost one-tenth of the results given in column (3) of Table 3. As for the
coecient for the three-year merger lag, we do not find any significant results. These results suggest that
the firms’ productivity declines after mergers.
Column (2) of Table 6 shows the results of merger decisions, and we find similar results to those in
Table 4 except for the debt–asset ratio, for which we do not find any significant results for the coecient
of previous mergers on current merger decisions.
8 Types of Merger
Table 7 shows the results when we split the full sample into domestic and cross-border mergers. The
results for domestic mergers appear similar to those obtained for the full sample. We again observe a
13.0% decline in productivity in the year following the merger, whereas the coecient for the three-
year lagged merger decision is significantly positive at the 10% level when the acquiring and target firms
reside in the same country. Consistent with the previous results, the positive eect of the year t 3 merger
on productivity is very small relative to the negative eect of the year t   3 merger.
For cross-border mergers, we find no positive result for the contribution of mergers to productivity
when domestic firms purchase foreign firms, and productivity even declines by 1% after the merger. This
result is consistent with the findings in Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006), who concluded that the eect
on TFP of a change from domestic to foreign ownership is, at best, zero unless the new ownership is
through a US aliate. The key dierence is that in this paper, all bidding firms are Japanese. One inter-
pretation of the negative eect of cross-border mergers on firm performance, as suggested by Bertrand
and Zuniga (2008), is the missed opportunity to attain economies of scale. That is, although cross-border
mergers enable firms to gain from geographically dispersed intangible assets, they make it dicult for
firms to achieve economies of scale through the concentration of production in a single location. Thus,
even if there might be an eciency gain from a cross-border merger, the loss of any potential economies
of scale osets such gains.
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In Table 8, we show the results when we use only horizontal mergers. In the case of horizontal
mergers, the coecient for a year t  2 merger is significantly negative, whereas the coecient for a year
t   3 merger is insignificant. We observe an 11.2% decline in productivity two years after the horizontal
merger.
All the results of merger decisions in Tables 9 and 10 show that larger firms are the most likely to
engage in mergers. As for the eect of leverage on merger decisions, we find that only the case of cross-
border mergers shows a negative eect of leverage on the merger decisions in Table 9. This means that
a firm with a higher equity ratio seeks to expand its business abroad using mergers. We also find no
contribution of previous mergers to the current merger decision in Tables 9 and 10; this is consistent with
previous results in the paper.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an alternative way of analyzing whether there is any evidence that firms im-
prove performance through mergers after incorporating the selection bias of mergers. We simultaneously
consider the dynamics of firm performance and the merger decision by employing FIML estimation.
We find that, without controlling for selection bias of merger decisions, mergers have no eect on
firm productivity. After controlling for selection bias, however, we find a large decline in productivity
following mergers, and a small increase at best in the third year after the merger. These results suggest
the importance of controlling selection bias to properly evaluate the productivity gains from mergers.
Our study diers from previous studies in that we incorporate state dependence, unobservable het-
erogeneity, and selection bias simultaneously. Because the eects of mergers may be felt gradually, the
dynamic eects of mergers and the factors associated with these dynamics should be taken into account.
Our FIML approach complements the strategy used in the extant literature for investigating the eects of
mergers on firm performance.
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Sum
Mergers(A) 60 61 71 84 71 88 87 107 629
Horizontal mergers(B) 32 33 43 44 44 49 46 67 358
(B)/(A)(%) 53.3 54.0 60.5 52.3 61.9 55.6 52.8 62.6 56.9
Domestic mergers (C) 40 42 53 68 54 66 53 68 444
Cross-border mergers(D) 20 19 18 16 17 22 34 39 185
(C)/(C+D)(%) 66.6 68.8 74.6 80.9 76.0 75.0 60.9 63.5 70.5
Table 1: Number of mergers. A merger is defined as horizontal where the bidder and target are in the same industry. A merger is defined as domestic
where both the bidder and target firms are Japanese. A merger is defined as cross-border where the bidder is domestic and the target firm is in another country.
Bidder characteristics Mean Median Std Q1 Q3
Number of Employee 4405 1817 8717.331 853 4333
Debt Asset 0.551 0.562 0.193 0.415 0.690
Cap/Lab 49.394 41.408 35.113 28.784 59.313
Sales 199941.9 68324 520918 30712 170757
Operational Profit 10510 2701 39470 1054 7437
ROA 0.045 0.040 0.040 0.021 0.064
q 1.100 0.999 0.495 0.866 1.191
Table 2: Summary statistics of bidding firms. We employ data for 589 Japanese firms listed on the First and Second Sections of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. The sample period is 1999–2006. We exclude firms in the financial and utility sectors from our sample because the regulation of these sectors
is substantially dierent from that of other sectors. We also exclude firms without any R&D expenditure record during the sample period. This process
generates a sample of 523 of the 589 firms included in the manufacturing sector. The financial data for the sample firms are from the Nikkei AMSUS and
NEEDS databases. Our merger data originate from RECOF’s M&A database of Japanese companies. We identify (a) all mergers with publicly traded bidding
firms and (b) all acquisitions including partial acquisitions with publicly traded bidding firms. We classify firms as engaging in a merger in the year in which
they announced the merger decision. In other years, firms are classified as nonmerger firms. Debt Asset is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cap/Lab is capital
intensity. ROA is the ratio of operational returns to total assets. q is Tobin’s q.
19
TFP eq (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS FIML FIML
Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample
Coecient t value Coecient t value Coecient Z value Coecient Z value
MA(-2) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.050 -0.126 -10.422 -0.126 -10.461
MA(-3) 0.007 0.680 0.007 0.660 0.0253 2.837 0.025 3.046
TFP(-1) 0.443 23.640 0.441 23.460 0.417 18.358 0.412 18.505
TFP(-2) -0.117 -6.120 -0.112 -5.890 -0.0878 -4.016 -0.082 -3.830
R&D -0.017 -1.580 -0.002 -0.140 0.005 2.439 0.033 2.701
R&D(-1) -0.036 -2.720 -0.055 -3.637
R&D(-2) 0.017 1.450 0.027 2.737
C 0.124 1.670 0.149 1.530 -0.023 -1.450 -0.022 -1.461
Log-Likelihood -1068.657 -1076.674
Adj-R2 0.194 0.196
Num of Obs 2945 2945 4712 4712
Table 3: TFP equation. MA(-2) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-2, and otherwise zero. MA(-3) is a dummy
variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-3, and otherwise zero. TFP(-1) is TFP in year t-1. TFP(-2) is TFP in year t-2. RD is R&D
expenditure in year t. R&D(-1) is R&D expenditure in year t-1. R&D(-2) is R&D expenditure in year t-2. C is the constant term. Year dummy variables are
included in the regression.
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Merger eq (1) (2)
FIML FIML
Full Sample Full Sample
TFP equation (3) in Table 3 (4) in Table 3
Coecient Z value Coecient Z value
MA(-1) 0.103 0.783 0.109 0.875
MA(-2) -0.023 -0.189 -0.014 -0.106
TFP(-1) 0.190 0.717 0.184 0.767
Emp 0.383 11.183 0.382 11.364
Debt -0.387 -2.140 -0.388 -2.163
Caplab 0.142 2.220 0.143 2.192
C -4.468 -11.482 -4.465 -11.168
corr12 0.665 0.666
corralpha12 -0.493 -0.496
Log-Likelihood -1068.657 -1076.674
Num of Obs 4712 4712
Table 4: Merger equation. MA(-1) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-1, and otherwise zero. MA(-2) is a dummy
variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-2, and otherwise zero. TFP(-1) is TFP in year t-1. Emp is the number of employees. Debt is the
debt-asset ratio. Caplab is capital intensity. C is the constant term. Year dummy variables are included. corr12 is the correlation between the distribution of
errors, (1; 2). corralpha12 is the correlation coecient between the unobserved heterogeneity terms,1 and 2.
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TFP eq (1) (2)
FIML FIML
Full Sample Full Sample
Coecient Z value Coecient Z value
MA(-2) -0.125 -10.246 -0.014 -2.105
MA(-3) 0.024 2.773 0.000 0.110
TFP(-1) 0.417 17.638 1.054 36.971
TFP(-2) -0.087 -3.997 -0.0349 -1.216
RD 0.005 2.300 0.002 3.949
Other MA(-2) 0.001 2.375
C -0.029 -1.836 -0.006 -1.629
Log-Likelihood -1072.384 -5859.522
Num of Obs 4712 4712
Table 5: TFP equation. MA(-2) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-2, and otherwise zero. MA(-3) is a dummy
variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-3, and otherwise zero. TFP(-1) is TFP in year t-1. TFP(-2) is TFP in year t-2. rd is R&D
expenditure in year t. OtherMA(-2) is the number of mergers by firms in a same industry. C is the constant term. Year dummy variables are included in the
regression. For the result in column (2), we measure TFP based on Levinsohn and Petrin(2003).
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Merger eq (1) (2)
FIML FIML
Full Sample Full Sample
TFP Equation (1) in Table 5 (2) in Table 5
Coecient Z value Coecient Z value
MA(-1) 0.090 0.726 -0.127 -0.766
MA(-2) -0.029 -0.245 -0.076 -0.517
TFP(-1) 0.186 0.878 0.210 0.967
Other MA(-2) 0.016 2.163
Emp 0.387 10.828 0.400 10.068
Debt -0.368 -1.902 0.068 0.358
Caplab 0.148 2.381 0.184 2.549
C -4.621 -11.238 -5.061 -11.866
corr12 0.662 0.344
corralpha -0.497 -0.185
Log-Likelihood -1072.384 -5859.522
Num of Obs 4712 4712
Table 6: Merger equation. MA(-1) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-1, and otherwise zero. MA(-2) is a dummy
variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-2, and otherwise zero. TFP(-1) is TFP in year t-1. OtherMA(-2) is the number of mergers by
firms in a same industy. Emp is the number of employees. Debt is the debt–asset ratio. Caplab is capital intensity. C is the constant term. Year dummy
variables are included. corr12 is the correlation between the distribution of errors, (1; 2). corralpha12 is the correlation coecient between the unobserved
heterogeneity terms,1 and 2. For the result in column (2), we measure TFP based on Levinsohn and Petrin(2003).
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TFP eq (1) (2) (3) (4)
FIML FIML FIML FIML
Domestic Cross-border Domestic Cross-border
Coecient Z value Coecient Z value Coecient Z value Coecient Z value
MA(-2) -0.130 -9.423 -0.099 -4.808 -0.129 -9.474 -0.099 -4.410
MA(-3) 0.017 1.744 0.018 1.145 0.016 1.769 0.019 1.170
TFP(-1) 0.418 18.116 0.423 16.677 0.413 17.916 0.418 18.620
TFP(-2) -0.0893 4.010 -0.091 -3.951 -0.085 -3.977 -0.086 -4.067
R&D 0.004 1.736 0.003 1.320 0.033 3.117 0.033 3.072
R&D(-1) -0.058 -3.853 -0.054 -3.874
R&D(-2) 0.025 2.516 0.023 2.326
C -0.015 -0.942 -0.018 -1.071 -0.014 -0.823 -0.0156 -1.017
Log-Likelihood -1206.983 -1802.175 -1218.158 -1809.944
Num of Obs 4712 4712 4712 4712
Table 7: TFP equation. Domestic includes only the deals between domestic firms as the dependent variable. Cross-border includes only the deals where
the bidder is a domestic firm and the target firm is from another country as the dependent variable. MA(-2) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm
announces a merger in year t-2, and otherwise zero. MA(-3) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-3, and otherwise zero.
TFP(-1) is TFP in year t-1. TFP(-2) is TFP in year t-2. RD is R&D expenditure in year t. R&D(-1) is R&D expenditure in year t-1. R&D(-2) is R&D
expenditure in year t-2. C is the constant term. Year dummy variables are included in the regression.
24
TFP eq (1) (2)
FIML FIML
Horizontal Horizontal
Coecient Z value Coecient Z value
MA(-2) -0.112 -6.989 -0.112 -6.701
MA(-3) -0.001 -0.056 -0.003 -0.214
TFP(-1) 0.420 19.791 0.415 18.767
TFP(-2) -0.087 -4.083 -0.083 -4.133
RD 0.004 2.176 0.035 3.178
R&D(-1) -0.055 -3.903
R&D(-2) 0.025 2.459
C -0.023 -1.546 -0.022 -1.377
Log-Likelihood -1410.555
Num of Obs 4712 4712
Table 8: TFP equation. Horizontal includes the only deals between firms in the same industry as the dependent variable. MA(-2) is a dummy variable
equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-2, and otherwise zero. MA(-3) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year
t-3, and otherwise zero. TFP(-1) is TFP in year t-1. TFP(-2) is TFP in year t-2. rd is R&D expenditure in year t. R&D(-1) is R&D expenditure in year t-1.
R&D(-2) is R&D expenditure in year t-2. C is the constant term. Year dummy variables are included in the regression.
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Merger eq (1) (2) (3) (4)
FIML FIML FIML FIML
Domestic Cross-border Domestic Cross-border
TFP equation (1) in Table 7 (2) in Table 7 (3) in Table 7 (4) in Table 7
Coecient Z value Coecient Z value Coecient Z value Coecient Z value
MA(-1) 0.118 0.682 -0.210 -0.881 0.129 0.517 -0.207 -0.811
MA(-2) 0.024 0.145 -0.047 -0.208 0.035 0.165 -0.042 -0.180
TFP(-1) 0.202 1.037 -0.472 -1.017 0.192 0.697 -0.468 -0.985
Emp 0.293 8.082 0.535 8.762 0.292 7.694 0.533 8.627
Debt -0.117 -0.536 -1.272 -4.013 -0.119 -0.607 -1.269 -3.882
Caplab 0.121 1.717 0.083 0.802 0.124 1.757 0.083 0.820
C -3.984 -9.733 -5.763 -8.977 -3.987 -10.084 -5.754 -9.017
corr12 0.616 0.604 0.615 0.604
corralpha12 -0.519 -0.638 -0.529 -0.638
hline Log-Likelihood -1206.983 -1802.175 -1218.158 -1809.944
Num of Obs 4712 4712 4712 4712
Table 9: Merger equation. MA(-1) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-1, and otherwise zero. MA(-2) is a dummy
variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-2, and otherwise zero. TFPlag is TFP in year t-1. Emp is the number of employees. debt is the
debt–asset ratio. Caplab is capital intensity. C is the constant term. Year dummy variables are included. corr12 is the correlation between the distribution of
errors, (1; 2). corralpha12 is the correlation coecient between the unobserved heterogeneity terms,1 and 2.
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Merger eq (1) (2)
FIML FIML
Horizontal Horizontal
TFP Equation (1) in Table 8 (2) in Table 8
Coecient Z value Coecient Z value
MA(-1) 0.093 0.693 0.086 0.626
MA(-2) 0.225 1.648 0.227 1.643
TFP(-1) 0.248 0.677 0.342 0.929
Emp 0.374 10.192 0.374 10.172
Debt -0.340 -1.686 -0.338 -1.628
Caplab 0.177 2.426 0.180 2.667
C -4.858 -10.770 -4.874 -11.241
corr12 0.516 0.516
corralpha 0.702 0.703
Log-Likelihood -1410.555 -1418.709
Num of Obs 4712 4712
Table 10: Merger equation. MA(-1) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-1, and otherwise zero. MA(-2) is a dummy
variable equal to one if a firm announces a merger in year t-2, and otherwise zero. TFP(-1) is TFP in year t-1. Emp is the number of employees. Debt is the
debt–asset ratio. Caplab is capital intensity. C is the constant term. Year dummy variables are included. corr12 is the correlation between the distribution of
errors, (1; 2). corralpha12 is the correlation coecient between the unobserved heterogeneity terms,1 and 2.
27
